hrubin@odds.stat.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:> The implication many make is that probability is a truth > value in the sense of logic; it is not. A truth value > system has the property that the truth value of a compound > proposition is determined from that of the components. > The truth value system used in probability is that of a > Boolean algebra, and probability is a functional on it
This is surely an important objection---I think I know what you are saying and if so I agree---but perhaps you could elaborate ... ?> BTW, the behavioristic Bayesian approach does not > start out with the prior as probability, but merely > as the measure corresponding to a positive linear > operator on utility functions, and it is only the > product of loss and prior which has implications for > the course of action.
OK, but it's also important to note that the approach does argue its way to a set of axioms for dealing with probabilities which are put forward as "normative"---_the_ laws of uncertain reasoning?